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1 Introduction
Therationalchoicemodelpioneeredbyeconomistsisrapidlybecomingthestandard
approach throughout the behavioral sciences. The model is attractive as it allows
the mathematical formalization of an essential truth, namely that when people act,
they are generally trying to accomplish something, and their efforts are more or
less effectively oriented to this end. However, its acceptance in other disciplines
coincides with an increasing recognition in economics of the limitations of the
behavioral assumptions sometimes summarized by the term Homo economicus.
While Homo economicus is not entailed by any of the axioms of the rational choice
model, in both teaching and research three assumptions embracing this behavioral
model are commonly treated as integral to the approach.
First, preferences are assumed to be outcome-regarding; i.e., agents care about
only the quantity and quality of goods and services that they possess and consume,
not about the social process through which their economic opportunities are deter-
mined. In fact, preferences are also in part process-regarding; agents care about
how they treat and are treated by others. In evaluating states, people care how those
statescometobeavailable. Inparticular, peoplecareaboutfairnessandreciprocity.
Second, preferences are assumed to be self-regarding: agent are assumed to care
only about states experienced by themselves, not by others. In fact, however, pref-
erences are in part other-regarding; agents care about the well-being of others, both
positively and negatively. In particular, people reward and punish the behavior of
others even at a net cost to themselves.
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Third, preferences are assumed to be either unchanging, or to evolve under
inﬂuences external to the social system under consideration. While a handy—even
indispensable—assumptionformanyanalyticaltasks, theassumptionofexogenous
preferences is strongly counter-intuitive, while the social formation of preferences,
as we will see, is strongly suggested by recent behavioral experiments.
Since Aristotle introduced the idea of zoon politikon, students of political be-
havior have recognized the importance of process-regarding, other-regarding and
endogenous preferences in explaining such essential aspects of political behavior
as the maintenance of social order, collective action to achieve common ends, po-
litical violence, and even the simple act of voting. Recent experimental research
has conﬁrmed the existence of process-regarding and other-regarding preferences.
One such preference, which we call strong reciprocity (Gintis 2000, Bowles and
Gintis2004a,Gintis, Bowles, BoydandFehr2004), isapredispositiontocooperate
with others, and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal
cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid either by
others or at a later date.
Weherepresentempiricalevidencesupportingstrongreciprocityasaschemafor
explainingimportantformsofpoliticalbehavior. Althoughmostoftheevidencewe
reportisbasedonbehavioralexperiments,thesamebehaviorsareregularlyobserved
in everyday life, for example in collective actions such as strikes and insurgencies
(Petersen 2002, Goodwin, Polletta and Jasper 2001, Wood 2003), wage setting by
ﬁrms (Bewley 2000), tax compliance (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998), and
cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods (Acheson 1988,
Ostrom 1998, Cardenas, Stranlund and Willis 2000, Ostrom, Dietz, Dolsak, Stern,
Stonich and Weber 2002).
Nothing in the material to be presented casts doubt on the rational actor frame-
work per se. Our concerns address the nature and origins of preferences, not
the underlying model of consequentialist choice. Decision theory shows that as
long as agents have consistent and complete preferences (meaning that an agent
who prefers A to B and prefers B to C also prefers A to C, and any two possible
choices can be compared in terms of desirability) over a ﬁnite choice set, their ac-
tions can be modeled as if maximizing a preference function subject to constraints
(Kreps 1988). Studies show that other-regarding preferences ﬁt this framework just
as well as the standard selﬁsh preferences of traditional economic theory (Andreoni
and Miller 2002). Contrary to a common usage, the fact that an action is other-
regarding does not make it “irrational” or even “non-rational.”
The reasons for the power of the rational actor model are clear. An agent’s pref-
erences, together with the agent’s beliefs concerning the means of achieving them
and the informational, material, and other constraints the agent faces have proven
remarkably illuminating in accounting for individual actions. Beliefs are an indi-
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vidual’s conception of the relationship between an act and an outcome. Preferences
are reasons for goal-oriented behavior. Preferences thus include a heterogeneous
melange: tastes (food likes and dislikes, for example), habits, emotions (such as
shame or anger) and other visceral reactions (such as fear), the manner in which
individuals construe situations (or more narrowly, the way they frame a decision),
commitments (like promises), socially enforced norms, psychological propensities
(for aggression, extroversion and the like), and one’s affective relationships with
others. To say that a person acts on her preferences means only that knowledge of
thepreferenceswouldbehelpfulinprovidingaconvincingaccountoftheactions—
though not necessarily the account which would be given by the actor, for as is well
known individuals are sometimes unable or unwilling to provide such an account.
We diverge from the standard preferences-beliefs-constraints model only by
positing the importance of other-regarding and process-regarding behavior in ac-
counting for human behavior in strategic interaction, and in taking the preferences
accounting for this behavior as endogenous.
2 Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market
We begin with an example of economic behavior in experimental labor markets, as
it neatly illustrates the kind of motives that are present in any kind of patron client
relationship or social exchange (Blau 1964). In Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger
(1997), the experimenters divided a group of 141 subjects (college students who
had agreed to participate in order to earn money) into a set of “employers” and a
larger set of “employees.” The rules of the game are as follows. If an employer
hires an employee who provides effort e and receives a wage w, they employer’s
payoff π is 100 times the effort e, minus the wage w that he must pay the employee
(π = 100e − w), where the wage is between zero and 100 (0 ≤ w ≤ 100), and
the effort between 0.1 and 1 (0.1 ≤ e ≤ 1). The payoff u to the employee is then
the wage he receives, minus a “cost of effort,” c(e) (u = w − c(e)). The cost of
effort schedule c(e) is constructed by the experimenters such that supplying effort
e = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0 cost the employee c(e) = 0,
1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 18, respectively. All payoffs are converted into real
money that the subjects are paid at the end of the experimental session.
The sequence of actions is as follows. The employer ﬁrst offers a “contract”
specifying a wage w and a desired amount of effort e∗. A contract is made with the
ﬁrst employee who agrees to these terms. An employer can make a contract (w,e∗)
with at most one employee. The employee who agrees to these terms receives the
wage w and supplies an effort level e, which need not equal the contracted effort,
e∗. In effect, there is no penalty if the employee does not keep his promise, so
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the employee can choose any effort level, e ∈[ 0.1,1], with impunity. Although
subjects may play this game several times with different partners, each employer-
employee interaction is a one-shot (non-repeated) event. Moreover, the identity of
the interacting partners is never revealed.
If employees are self-regarding, they will choose the zero-cost effort level,
e = 0.1, no matter what wage is offered them. Knowing this, employers will never
pay more than the minimum necessary to get the employee to accept a contract,
which is 1 (assuming only integral wage offers are permitted). The employee will
accept this offer, and will set e = 0.1. Since c(0.1) = 0, the employee’s payoff is
u = 1. The employer’s payoff is π = 0.1 × 100 − 1 = 9.
In fact, however, this self-regarding outcome rarely occurred in this experi-
ment. The average net payoff to employees was u = 35, and the more generous
the employer’s wage offer to the employee, the higher the effort provided. In ef-
fect, employers presumed the strong reciprocity predispositions of the employees,
making quite generous wage offers and receive higher effort, as a means to increase
both their own and the employee’s payoff, as depicted in Figure 1. Similar results
have been observed in Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993,1998).
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Figure 1: Relation of Contracted and Delivered Effort to Worker Payoff (141
subjects). From Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997).
Figure 1 also shows that, though most employees are strong reciprocators, at
any wage rate there still is a signiﬁcant gap between the amount of effort agreed
upon and the amount actually delivered. This is not because there are a few “bad
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apples” among the set of employees, but because only 26% of employees delivered
thelevelofefforttheypromised! Weconcludethatstrongreciprocatorsareinclined
to compromise their morality to some extent, just as we might expect from daily
experience.
The above evidence is compatible with the notion that the employers are purely
self-regarding, since their beneﬁcent behavior vis-á-vis their employees was effec-
tiveinincreasingemployerproﬁts. Toseeifemployersarealsostrongreciprocators,
following this round of experiments, the authors extended the game by allowing the
employers to respond reciprocally to the actual effort choices of their workers. At a
cost of 1, an employer could increase or decrease his employee’s payoff by 2.5. If
employers were self-regarding, they would of course do neither, since they would
not interact with the same worker a second time. However, 68% of the time, em-
ployers punished employees that did not fulﬁll their contracts, and 70% of the time,
employers rewarded employees who overfulﬁlled their contracts. Indeed, employ-
ers rewarded 41% of employees who exactly fulﬁlled their contracts. Moreover,
employees expected this behavior on the part of their employers, as shown by the
factthattheireffortlevelsincreasedsigniﬁcantlywhentheirbossesgainedthepower
to punish and reward them. Underfulﬁlling contracts dropped from 83% to 26% of
theexchanges, andoverfulﬁlledcontractsrosefrom3%to38%ofthetotal. Finally,
allowing employers to reward and punish led to a 40% increase in the net payoffs to
all subjects, even when the payoff reductions resulting from employer punishment
of employees are taken into account. Several researchers have predicted this gen-
eral behavior on the basis of general real-life social observation and ﬁeld studies,
including Homans (1961), Blau (1964), andAkerlof (1982). The laboratory results
showthatthisbehaviorhasamotivationalbasisinstrongreciprocityandnotsimply
long-term material self-interest.
Weconcludefromthisstudythatthesubjectswhoassumetheroleof“employee”
conform to internalized standards of reciprocity, even when they know there are
no material repercussions from behaving in a self-regarding manner. Moreover,
subjects who assume the role of “employer” expect this behavior and are rewarded
for acting accordingly. Finally, “employers” draw upon the internalized norm of
rewarding good and punishing bad behavior when they are permitted to punish, and
“employees” expect this behavior and adjust their own effort levels accordingly.
3 A Predisposition for Fairness in the Ultimatum Game
The next set of experiments evokes themes raised by Barrington Moore, Jr. (1978)
in his study of obedience and revolt and James Scott (1976) in his study of rebel-
lion in a moral economy: commitments to justice run deep, and violations of fair
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treatment are likely to be harshly treated. In the ultimatum game, under conditions
of anonymity, two players are shown a sum of money, say $10. One of the players,
called the “proposer,” is instructed to offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10,
to the second player, who is called the “responder.” The proposer can make only
one offer. The responder, again under conditions of anonymity, can either accept or
reject this offer. If the responder accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly.
If the responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing.
Since the game is played only once and the players do not know each other’s
identity, a self-regarding responder will accept any positive amount of money.
Knowing this, a self-regarding proposer will offer the minimum possible amount,
$1,andthiswillbeaccepted. However,whenactuallyplayed,theself-regardingout-
come is never attained and never even approximated. In fact, as many replications
of this experiment have documented, under varying conditions and with varying
amounts of money, proposers routinely offer respondents very substantial amounts
(50%ofthetotalgenerallybeingthemodaloffer),andrespondentsfrequentlyreject
offersbelow30%(CamererandThaler1995,GüthandTietz1990,Roth, Prasnikar,
Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir 1991).
The ultimatum game has been played around the world, but mostly with univer-
sitystudents. Weﬁndagreatdealofindividualvariability. Forinstance,inallofthe
above experiments a signiﬁcant fraction of subjects (about a quarter, typically) be-
haveinaself-regardingmanner. But, amongstudentsubjects, averageperformance
is strikingly uniform from country to country.
To expand the diversity of cultural and economic circumstances of experimen-
tal subjects, Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis and McElreath (2001)
undertook a large cross-cultural study of behavior in various games including the
ultimatumgame. Twelveexperiencedﬁeldresearchers,workingintwelvecountries
on four continents, recruited subjects from ﬁfteen small-scale societies exhibiting
a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. These societies consisted of
three foraging groups (the Hadza of East Africa, the Au and Gnau of Papua New
Guinea,andtheLamaleraofIndonesia),sixslash-and-burnhorticulturists(theAché,
Machiguenga, Quichua, andAchuar of SouthAmerica, and the Tsimané and Orma
of East Africa), four nomadic herding groups (the Turguud, Mongols, and Kaza-
khs of Central Asia, and the Sangu of East Africa) and two sedentary, small-scale
agricultural societies (the Mapuche of South America and Zimbabwe farmers in
Africa).
We can summarize our results as follows.
The canonical model of self-regarding behavior is not supported in any society
studied. In the ultimatum game, for example, in all societies either respondents, or
proposers, or both, behaved in a reciprocal manner.
There is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been
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found in previous cross-cultural research. While mean ultimatum game offers in
experiments with student subjects are typically between 43% and 48%, the mean
offers from proposers in our sample ranged from 26% to 58%. While modal ulti-
matum game offers are consistently 50% among university students, sample modes
withthesedatarangedfrom15%to50%. Insomegroupsrejectionswereextremely
rare, even in the presence of very low offers, while in others, rejection rates were
substantial, including frequent rejections of hyper-fair offers (i.e. offers above
50%). By contrast, the most common behavior for the Machiguenga was to offer
zero. The mean offer was 22%. The Aché and Tsimané distributions resemble
American distributions, but with very low rejection rates. The Orma and Huinca
(non-Mapuche Chileans living among the Mapuche) have modal offers near the
center of the distribution, but show secondary peaks at full cooperation.
Differences among societies in “market integration” and “cooperation in pro-
duction” explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation between groups:
the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to coopera-
tion, the greater the level of cooperation and sharing in experimental games. The
societies were rank-ordered in ﬁve categories—“market integration” (how often do
people buy and sell, or work for a wage), “cooperation in production” (is produc-
tioncollectiveorindividual),plus“anonymity”(howprevalentareanonymousroles
andtransactions), “privacy”(howeasilycanpeoplekeeptheiractivitiessecret), and
“complexity” (how much centralized decision-making occurs above the level of the
household). Using statistical regression analysis, only the ﬁrst two characteristics,
market integration and cooperation in production, were signiﬁcant, and they to-
getheraccountedfor66%ofthevariationamongsocietiesinmeanultimatumgame
offers.
Individual-level economic and demographic variables did not explain behavior
either within or across groups.
The nature and degree of cooperation and punishment in the experiments was
generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies.
In a number of cases the parallels between experimental game play and the
structure of daily life were quite striking. Nor was this relationship lost on the
subjects themselves. Here are some examples.
TheOrmaimmediatelyrecognizedthatthepublicgoodsgamewassimilartothe
harambee,alocally-initiatedcontributionthathouseholdsmakewhenacommunity
decides to construct a road or school. They dubbed the experiment “the harambee
game” and gave generously (mean 58% with 25% maximal contributors).
Among the Au and Gnau, many proposers offered more than half the pie, and
many of these “hyper-fair” offers were rejected! This reﬂects the Melanesian cul-
ture of status-seeking through gift giving. Making a large gift is a bid for social
dominance in everyday life in these societies, and rejecting the gift is a rejection of
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being subordinate.
Among the whale hunting Lamalera, 63% of the proposers in the ultimatum
game divided the pie equally, and most of those who did not, offered more than
50% (the mean offer was 57%). In real life, a large catch, always the product
of cooperation among many individual whalers, is meticulously divided into pre-
designated parts and carefully distributed among the members of the community.
AmongtheAché,79%ofproposersofferedeither40%or50%,and16%offered
morethan50%, withnorejectedoffers. Indailylife, theAchéregularlysharemeat,
whichisbeingdistributedequallyamongallotherhouseholds,irrespectiveofwhich
hunter made the kill.
The Hadza, unlike theAché, made low offers and had high rejection rates in the
ultimatum game. This reﬂects the tendency of these small-scale foragers to share
meat, but with a high level of conﬂict and frequent attempts of hunters to hide their
catch from the group.
BoththeMachiguengaandTsimanémadelowultimatumgameoffers,andthere
were virtually no rejections. These groups exhibit little cooperation, exchange or
sharing beyond the family unit. Ethnographically, both show little fear of social
sanctions and care little about “public opinion.”
The Mapuche’s social relations are characterized by mutual suspicion, envy,
and fear of being envied. This pattern is consistent with the Mapuche’s post-game
interviews in the ultimatum game. Mapuche proposers rarely claimed that their
offers were inﬂuenced by fairness, but rather by a fear of rejection. Even proposers
who made hyper-fair offers claimed that they feared rare spiteful responders, who
would be willing to reject even 50/50 offers.
4 Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment in the Public Goods
Game
Our ﬁnal set of experiments illuminates the tension between free riding and civic
virtuecentraltothemasterworksofpoliticaltheorysinceHumeandRousseau. The
publicgoodsgamehasbeenanalyzedinaseriesofpapersbythesocialpsychologist
Toshio Yamagishi (1986,1988), by the political scientist Elinor Ostrom and her
coworkers (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992), and by economists Ernst Fehr and
his coworkers (Gächter and Fehr 1999, Fehr and Gächter 2000,2002). These
researchers uniformly found that groups exhibit a much higher rate of cooperation
than can be expected assuming the standard economic model of the self-regarding
actor, and this is especially the case when subjects are given the option of incurring
a cost to themselves in order to punish free riders.
A typical public goods game consists of a number of rounds, say ten. The
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subjects are told the total number of rounds, as well as all other aspects of the game.
The subjects are paid their winnings in real money at the end of the session. In
each round, each subject is grouped with several other subjects—say 3 others—
under conditions of strict anonymity. Each subject is then given a certain number
of ‘points,’ say twenty, redeemable at the end of the experimental session for real
money. Eachsubjectthenplacessomefractionofhispointsina‘commonaccount,’
and the remainder in the subject’s ‘private account.’ The experimenter then tells
the subjects how many points were contributed to the common account, and adds
to the private account of each subject some fraction, say 40%, of the total amount
in the common account. So if a subject contributes his whole twenty points to the
common account, each of the four group members will receive eight points at the
end of the round. In effect, by putting the whole endowment into the common
account, a player loses twelve points but the other three group members gain in
total 24 (= 8 × 3) points. The players keep whatever is in their private account at
the end of the round.
A self-regarding player will contribute nothing to the common account. How-
ever, only a fraction of subjects in fact conform to the self-interest model. Subjects
begin by contributing on average about half of their endowment to the public ac-
count. The level of contributions decays over the course of the ten rounds, until in
the ﬁnal rounds most players are behaving in a self-regarding manner (Dawes and
Thaler 1988, Ledyard 1995). In a meta-study of twelve public goods experiments
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) found that in the early rounds, average and median con-
tribution levels ranged from 40% to 60% of the endowment, but in the ﬁnal period
73% of all individuals (N = 1042) contributed nothing, and many of the remaining
players contributed close to zero. These results are not compatible with the self-
regarding actor model, which predicts zero contribution on all rounds, though they
might be predicted by a reciprocal altruism model, since the chance to reciprocate
declines as the end of the experiment approaches. However this is not in fact the
explanation of moderate but deteriorating levels of cooperation in the public goods
game.
The explanation of the decay of cooperation offered by subjects when de-
briefed after the experiment is that cooperative subjects became angry at others
who contributed less than themselves, and retaliated against free-riding low con-
tributors in the only way available to them—by lowering their own contributions
(Andreoni 1995).
Experimental evidence supports this interpretation. When subjects are allowed
to punish noncontributors, they do so at a cost to themselves (Orbell, Dawes, and
Van de Kragt, 1986; Sato 1987;Yamagishi, 1988a,1988b,1992). For instance, in
Ostrom et al. (1992) subjects interacted for twenty-ﬁve periods in a public goods
game,andbypayinga‘fee,’subjectscouldimposecostsonothersubjectsby‘ﬁning’
October 26, 2004Homo Economicus and Zoon Politikon 10
them. Since ﬁning costs the individual who uses it, but the beneﬁts of increased
compliance accrue to the group as a whole, the only Nash equilibrium in this game
that does not depend on incredible threats is for no player to pay the fee, so no
player is ever punished for defecting, and all players defect by contributing nothing
to the common pool. However the authors found a signiﬁcant level of punishing
behavior.
These studies allowed individuals to engage in strategic behavior, since costly
punishment of defectors could increase cooperation in future periods, yielding a
positive net return for the punisher. Fehr and Gächter (2000) set up an experimental
situation in which the possibility of strategic punishment was removed. They used
six and ten round public goods games with groups of size four, and with costly
punishment allowed at the end of each round, employing three different methods of
assigning members to groups. There were sufﬁcient subjects to run between 10 and
18 groups simultaneously. Under the Partner treatment, the four subjects remained
in the same group for all ten periods. Under the Stranger treatment, the subjects
were randomly reassigned after each round. Finally, under the Perfect Stranger
treatment the subjects were randomly reassigned and assured that they would never
meet the same subject more than once. Subjects earned an average of about $35 for
an experimental session.
FehrandGächter(2000)performedtheirexperimentfortenroundswithpunish-
ment and ten rounds without (for additional experimental results and their analysis,
see Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Fehr and Gächter (2002).) Their results are illus-
trated in Figure 2. We see that when costly punishment is permitted, cooperation
does not deteriorate, and in the Partner game, despite strict anonymity, cooperation
increases almost to full cooperation, even on the ﬁnal round. When punishment
is not permitted, however, the same subjects experience the deterioration of coop-
eration found in previous public goods games. The contrast in cooperation rates
between the Partner and the two Stranger treatments is worth noting, because the
strengthofpunishmentisroughlythesameacrossalltreatments. Thissuggeststhat
the credibility of the punishment threat is greater in the Partner treatment because
in this treatment the punished subjects are certain that, once they have been pun-
ishedinpreviousrounds, thepunishingsubjectsareintheirgroup. Theprosociality
impact of strong reciprocity on cooperation is thus more strongly manifested, the
more coherent and permanent the group in question.
5 Conclusion
The evidence for other-regarding, process-regarding, and endogenous preferences
is compelling. But, it raises a puzzle, one that we address in greater detail in
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Figure 2: Average Contributions over Time in the Partner, Stranger, and Perfect
Stranger Treatments when the Punishment Condition is Played First
(adapted from Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
a related paper (Bowles and Gintis 2005). If many of us are fair-minded and
reciprocal, then we must have acquired these preferences somehow, and it would
be a good check on the plausibility of the views advanced here and the empirical
evidence on which they are based to see if a reasonable account of the evolutionary
success of these preferences can be provided. Generosity toward one’s biological
kin is readily explained (Hamilton 1964). The evolutionary puzzle concerns non-
selﬁshbehaviorstowardsnon-kin. Amongnon-kin, selﬁshpreferenceswouldseem
to be favored by any payoff-rewarding evolutionary process, whether genetic or
cultural. Thus, the fair-mindedness that induces people to transfer resources to
the less well-off, and the reciprocity motives that impel us to incur the costs of
punishingthosewhoviolategroupnorms, onthisaccount, aredoomedtoextinction
by long term evolutionary processes. If other regarding preferences are common,
this conventional evolutionary account must be incorrect.
Inmanycases,theevolutionarysuccessofwhatappeartobeunselﬁshtraitsisex-
plainedbythefactthatwhenanaccountingoflong-termandindirecteffectsisdone,
the behaviors are payoff maximizing, often representing forms of mutualism. The
great hunter who shares his prey may, by advertising his prowess, recruit coalition
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partnersandmatesanddeteropponents(Gintis,SmithandBowles2001). But,some
seemingly generous behaviors are just what they seem. Indeed, the experiments we
havecitedweredesignedtostudybehaviorintheabsenceoftheindirectorlong-term
beneﬁts just mentioned. The behaviors observed in these experiments, we think,
havebecomecommonbecausetheycontributetothesuccessofgroupsinwhichthe
behaviors are common. People in successful groups tend to be copied, either genet-
ically or culturally, and thus genuinely other-regarding preferences can proliferate.
Recent theoretical modeling, anthropological studies, and agent-based computer
simulationslendsomecredibilitytothisaccount(Gintis2000,Boehm2000,Bowles,
Choi and Hopfensitz 2003, Gintis et al. 2004, Bowles and Gintis 2004b, Bowles
and Gintis 2004a)
The experimental evidence as well as observation of economic and political
behavior in natural settings does not lead us to reject the rational actor model,
for that model, in its minimalist conception as consistency and completeness of
preferences, is perfectly compatible with altruistic, spiteful, or reciprocal motives.
Indeed, this versatility is among its merits.
However, an adequate reformulation of the psychological foundations of the
behavioral sciences cannot be accomplished by inventing some new Homo socio-
logicus or zoon politikon to replace Homo economicus as the epitome of intentional
behavior. Behavioral experiments and everyday observation make it clear that pop-
ulations are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity makes a difference in outcomes. But,
as the public goods experiments showed, its effects are not adequately captured
by a process of simple averaging. The outcome of interaction among a population
that is composed of equal numbers of saints and sinners will not generally be the
average of the outcomes of two populations with just one type. The reason is that
in many settings, the norm-upholding activities of a few saints may induce even
the sinners to act civic-mindedly, while in other institutional settings, a few sinners
can induce all players to act like Homo economicus. Recall, as another example,
that in the public goods-with-punishment game, those with reciprocal preferences
not only acted generously themselves, but they apparently also induced the selﬁsh
types to act as if they were generous.
Indeed, seemingly small differences in institutions can make large differences
inoutcomes, asillustratedbythefollowingexample. Imagineaone-shotPrisoners’
Dilemma game played between a self-regarding player, for whom defect is the
dominant strategy in the simultaneous moves game, and a strong reciprocator, who
preferstocooperateiftheothercooperatesandtodefectotherwise(Kiyonari,Tanida
andYamagishi 2000, Fehr and Fischbacher 2001). Suppose the players’ types are
knowntoeach. Ifthegameisplayedsimultaneously, thereciprocator, knowingthat
theotherwilldefect, willdothesame. Theoutcomewillbemutualdefection. Ifthe
self-regarding player moves ﬁrst, however, he will know that the reciprocator will
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match whatever action he takes, narrowing the possible outcomes to {cooperate,
cooperate} or {defect, defect}, the former yielding both players a higher payoff.
The self-regarding ﬁrst mover will therefore cooperate and mutual cooperation will
be sustained as the outcome.
In addition to heterogeneity across individuals, versatility of individuals must
also be accounted for. In the ultimatum game, many proposers often offer amounts
thatmaximizetheirexpectedpayoffs,giventheobservedrelationshipbetweenoffers
and rejections: they behave selﬁshly but expect responders not to. And they are
correct in this belief! The same individuals, when in the role of responder, typically
reject substantial offers if they appear to be unfair, thus conﬁrming the expectations
of the proposer and violating the self-interest axiom.
Finally, as our cross-cultural experiments suggest, culture matters: differences
in an individual’s preferences often correspond to differences in the way people
interact socially in making their living and in other aspects of daily life. This
meansthatpopulationsthatexperiencedifferentstructuresofsocialinteractionover
prolonged periods are likely to exhibit differing behaviors, not simply because the
constraints entailed by these institutions are different but also because the structure
of social interaction affects the evolution of preferences.
Progress in the direction of a more adequate behavioral foundation for political
behavior must take account of these three aspects of people: namely their hetero-
geneity, their versatility, and their plasticity.
References
Acheson,J.,TheLobsterGangsofMaine(Hanover,NH:NewEnglandUniversities
Press, 1988).
Akerlof, GeorgeA., “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 97,4 (November 1982):543–569.
Andreoni, James, “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confu-
sion,” American Economic Review 85,4 (1995):891–904.
and John H. Miller, “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the
Consistency of Preferences forAltruism,” Econometrica 70,2 (2002):737–753.
, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein, “Tax Compliance,” Journal of Economic
Literature 36,2 (June 1998):818–860.
Bewley, Truman F., Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000).
Blau, Peter, Exchange and Power in Social Life (NewYork: John Wiley, 1964).
Boehm,Christopher,HierarchyintheForest: TheEvolutionofEgalitarianBehavior
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
October 26, 2004Homo Economicus and Zoon Politikon 14
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis, “Homo Reciprocans,” Nature 415 (10 January
2002):125–128.
and , “The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous
Populations,” Theoretical Population Biology 65 (2004):17–28.
and , “The Origins of Human Cooperation,” in Peter Hammerstein (ed.)
GeneticandCulturalOriginsofCooperation(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2004).
and , “Evolutionary Origins of Collective Action,” in Donald Wittman and
BarryWeingast (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
,Jung-kyooChoi,andAstridHopfensitz,“TheCo-evolutionofIndividualBehav-
iorsandSocialInstitutions,”JournalofTheoreticalBiology223(2003):135–147.
Camerer,ColinandRichardThaler,“Ultimatums,Dictators,andManners,”Journal
of Economic Perspectives 9,2 (1995):209–219.
Cardenas, Juan Camilo, John K. Stranlund, and Cleve E. Willis, “Local Environ-
mentalControlandInstitutionalCrowding-out,”WorldDevelopment28,10(July
2000):1719–1733.
Dawes, Robyn M. and Richard Thaler, “Cooperation,” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 2 (1988):187–197.
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt, “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Coop-
eration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (August 1999):817–868.
and Simon Gächter, “Cooperation and Punishment,” American Economic Re-
view 90,4 (September 2000):980–994.
and , “AltruisticPunishmentinHumans,” Nature415(10January2002):137–
140.
andUrsFischbacher,“WhySocialPreferencesMatter,”2001.NobelSymposium
on Behavioral and Experimental Economics.
,GeorgKirchsteiger,andArnoRiedl,“DoesFairnessPreventMarketClearing?,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108,2 (1993):437–459.
, , and , “Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental
Markets,” European Economic Review 42,1 (1998):1–34.
,SimonGächter,andGeorgKirchsteiger,“ReciprocityasaContractEnforcement
Device: Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica 65,4 (July 1997):833–860.
Gächter, Simon and Ernst Fehr, “Collective Action as a Social Exchange,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 39,4 (July 1999):341–369.
Gintis, Herbert, “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,” Journal of Theoretical
Biology 206 (2000):169–179.
, Eric Alden Smith, and Samuel Bowles, “Costly Signaling and Cooperation,”
Journal of Theoretical Biology 213 (2001):103–119.
October 26, 2004Homo Economicus and Zoon Politikon 15
, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, Moral Sentiments and Material
Interests: On the Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (MIT Press,
2004).
Goodwin, Jeff, Francesca Polletta, and James. M. Jasper, Passionate Politics: Emo-
tions and Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
Güth, Werner and Reinhard Tietz, “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey
and Comparison of Experimental Results,” Journal of Economic Psychology 11
(1990):417–449.
Hamilton,WilliamD., “TheGeneticalEvolutionofSocialBehaviorI&II,”Journal
of Theoretical Biology 7 (1964):1–16,17–52.
Henrich, Joseph, RobertBoyd, SamuelBowles, ColinCamerer, ErnstFehr, Herbert
Gintis, and Richard McElreath, “Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in
Fifteen Small-scale Societies,” American Economic Review 91 (May 2001):73–
78.
Homans, George, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1961).
Kiyonari, Toko, Shigehito Tanida, and Toshio Yamagishi, “Social Exchange and
Reciprocity: Confusion or a Heuristic?,” Evolution and Human Behavior 21
(2000):411–427.
Kreps, David M., Notes on the Theory of Choice (London: Westview, 1988).
Ledyard, J. O., “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,” in J. H. Kagel
andA.E.Roth(eds.)TheHandbookofExperimentalEconomics(Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995) pp. 111–194.
Moore,Jr.,Barrington,Injustice: TheSocialBasesofObedienceandRevolt(White
Plains: M. E. Sharpe, 1978).
Orbell, John M., Robyn M. Dawes, and J. C. Van de Kragt, “Organizing Groups
for Collective Action,” American Political Science Review 80 (December
1986):1171–1185.
Ostrom, Elinor, “A BehavioralApproach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collec-
tiveAction,” American Political Science Review 92,1 (March 1998):1–21.
, James Walker, and Roy Gardner, “Covenants with and without a Sword:
Self-Governance Is Possible,” American Political Science Review 86,2 (June
1992):404–417.
, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber,
The Drama of the Commons (Washington: NationalAcademy Press, 2002).
Petersen, Roger D., Understaneing Ethnic Violence, Fear, Hatred, and Resentment
in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002).
October 26, 2004Homo Economicus and Zoon Politikon 16
Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Shmuel Za-
mir, “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and
Tokyo: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review 81,5 (December
1991):1068–1095.
Sato, Kaori, “Distribution and the Cost of Maintaining Common Property Re-
sources,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 23 (January 1987):19–31.
Scott, James C., The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in
Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1976).
Wood, Elisabeth Jean, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador
(Cambridge,: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Yamagishi, Toshio, “The Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (1986):110–116.
, “The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan,” Social
Psychology Quarterly 51,3 (1988):265–271.
, “Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System,”
Social Psychology Quarterly 51,1 (1988):32–42.
, “Group Size and the Provision of a Sanctioning System in a Social Dilemma,”
in W.B.G. Liebrand, David M. Messick, and H.A.M. Wilke (eds.) Social Dilem-
mas: TheoreticalIssuesandResearchFindings(Oxford: PergamonPress, 1992)
pp. 267–287.
c\Papers\Goodin-Tilly Oxford Handbook\Homo Economicus and Zoon Politikon.tex October 26, 2004
October 26, 2004